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Ministers, Your Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen,
It gives me great pleasure to participate in this conference, and to see a number of familiar faces
here today. I know that C. Patten and many other distinguished  speakers before me have provided
major contributions to this important  debate. I am honoured to conclude your Conference today,
But - needless to say - this conclusion will not mean the end of our work, nor indeed of your debate
in this delicate field.
You have rightly described in your title the CFSP as the integration project of the next decade. This
is ambitious language; but ambition is what we need in this area. The historic decisions taken last
weekend in Helsinki have provided  us with a roadmap which will help us steer a clear path on this
issue over the next few years, I would like to explore with you how I see that path developing,  and
look in a little more detail at where it will take us, If the current momentum is sustained, we shall
need much less than a decade before we begin to see real results.
Since taking up my post almost exactly two months ago, I have been struck by the commitment of
Member States to developing  an effective Common Foreign and Security Policy. It is a policy which
touches at the very heart of the sovereignty of the nation state. It has required considerable vision
by many national leaders. And the recognition  that collective influence at the European level is the
only way to respond to many of the global challenges of our times.
But a Common Foreign and Security Policy can only be effective if it is backed up by effective
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instruments.  The European  Union has a wide range of instruments at its disposal, particularly in the
economic sphere. The commitment taken in Helsinki is to complement these with an effective
security capability. Let us take a  closer look at  what this commitment  implies.
Firstly, we have reached agreement on a common headline goal on military capabilities.  This
contains specific objectives, to be reached within agreed deadlines. This is essential if we are to be
credible internationally.
Secondly, we have agreed on the structures which will be necessary in order to ensure the political
control and strategic direction of these capabilities. These have to respect fully the sovereign right
of Member States to decide whether or not to contribute their national assets to an operation, but
they have also to  provide for the effective and rapid management of  operations.
Thirdly, we have agreed on the need for sound and transparent  procedures for consultation and
cooperation with non-EU countries,  and with NATO.
I will dwell in a moment on each of these issues in turn in more detail. But first I wish to elaborate
on why the EU is going down this road. Whenever the EU takes forward-looking decisions such as
at Helsinki, there are always those who criticise us for going too far, or for going in the wrong
direction. Others simply need reassurance. I am convinced that the path we have now embarked
upon offers the Union the opportunity of playing a greater role in ensuring that the world as a
whole is more stable, more secure and more prosperous.  This has to be to everyone's benefit.
The decision at Helsinki has been misrepresented in some quarters as the first step in the
establishment of a European army, or else as an unnecessary "militarisation" of the EU. And yet,
we could not have been clearer about our objectives,
Most importantly,  we have made clear that ESDP is not about collective  defence. NATO will remain
the foundation of the collective defence of its members. We are in no way attempting  to duplicate
the work of NATO, In fact the improvements in European military capabilities will be a significant
gain for the Alliance. Nor does ESDP attempt to undermine the right of Member States to retain
their own specific security and defence policy, The fact that all Member States, including  the
neutral countries, have been able to endorse the Helsinki decision, should provide sufficient
reassurance  on this point. So much for what ESDP is not.
What Helsinki has done is to set in train a process which will enable us to assume full responsibility
across the whole range of conflict prevention and crisis management tasks. Why is this so
important? Over the last forty years, the European Union has become one of the most sophisticated
and advanced examples of regional integration in the world. The EU is now the largest trading bloc
in the world and a major actor across the whole range of global, financial and economic  arena.
But globalisation and growing interdependence  mean that we can no longer see the rest of the
world purely in terms of economic  objectives. Globalisation has brought with it a wide range of
transnational challenges, many of which were unheard of a generation  ago. The threat of terrorism,
international drug dealing, money-laundering, the spread of AIDS: all these present us with new,
"globalised" problems and new responsibilities. The uneasy development of the Common Foreign
and Security Policy since the Maastricht Treaty had provided us only with limited means to respond
to these challenges.
But a CFSP without the tools is a hollow shell. The EU can and does bring its economic weight to
bear in support of political objectives. It does so in the course of WTO negotiations; in support of
economic reconstruction; as a protagonist of development policies throughout the world. You can
argue that the use of these economic instruments can be developed  further and be made more
efficient - but they undoubtedly constitute a strength for the Union's policies. What we need to do,
is to complement  them with an effective security capability, if we are to bring our influence to bear
in the world. As the Union enlarges, and as we face new challenges in the next century, we have to
be prepared to take more responsibility for regional security, particularly in those areas bordering
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the Union where we have direct interests at stake. We also have to be prepared, where necessary,
to use all legitimate means to project security and stability beyond our borders. And we need to be
able to assert our values of humanitarian solidarity and respect for human rights in all areas where
peoples' lives depend on relief assistance, because they are the victims of natural catastrophes,  or
of man-made crises.
What are the tools we need to achieve this? Firstly at Helsinki we have committed ourselves to
being able to deploy a corps level military operation within 60 days, and to sustain it for at least a
year. This capacity will be coupled with the development of command, control and intelligence
capabilities, as well as all the necessary support services to sustain an operation of this scale. This
is the first of the basic building blocks of an effective Security and Defence Policy. Our commitment
to a viable operational capacity is a sign of our determination  to be credible in the eyes of our
public, of our partners, and of the international community as a whole.
Secondly, we have endorsed the establishment of new permanent  political and military bodies
within the Council to ensure both adequate political accountability, and rapid and effective
decision-making procedures for the day-to-day  management  of operations. It is essential that we
keep the decision-making process as short and flexible as possible to ensure a quick response in
the event of a crisis. We also need to ensure that there is appropriate  input from the Member
States' Chief of Staff to provide an adequate level of military expertise.  This is the objective of the
creation of the Military Committee, which will have a key role in the decision-making  process.
Because these structures will take some time to set up (and may even require amendments  to the
existing treaties), we agreed at Helsinki to establish as of March next year interim bodies to
prepare for the future functioning of the Security and Defence Policy.
Thirdly, we have taken steps to ensure that appropriate measures are put in place for the
consultation  and cooperation with non-EU European allies, and with NATO.
The relationship between our objectives and NATO's own deserves a comment. This is the one area
which seems to have caused the most apprehension. I recognise that sensitivities are at stake here,
as highlighted also in the course of the NAC meeting of last Wednesday. But a careful reading of
the Helsinki text should help providing reassurance.  The message bears repeating: the
strengthening of a European Security and Defence identity will not in any way undermine the role
of NATO. Last week the British Chief of Defence Staff said that "A Europe that remains allied to the
US simply because of its own weakness is of limited value", I fully share this view. It is in
everyone's  interest, on both sides of the Atlantic, that Europe is stronger and that it develops the
means to be more assertive in its reactions to international crises.
We do not intend to duplicate the work of NATO. We do not want to, and do not need to. In any
case, in a world of tight defence budgets, we cannot afford unnecessary  duplication. Helsinki
therefore makes clear that the Union has as its objective the capacity to conduct EU-led military
operations in response to international crises, but onlv where NATO as a whole is not engaged. This
will remain a guiding principle.
Developing the capacity to achieve this objective will involve increasing cooperation  between
Member States on very practical issues such as the interoperability of our respective forces. Aqain.
this can only be to the advantage of NATO. It will help strengthen NATO's own capabilities. It will
also enhance the ability of those Member States who are members of NATO to play a more effective
role in NATO-led operations.
The European Union will have to become an intelligent customer of NATO. When NATO itself is not
engaged, but the European Union launches a military operation, it should if necessary have
recourse to NATO assets and capabilities.  This means that full consultation, cooperation  and
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transparency  between the EU and NATO will have to be developed. I have been mandated jointly
with the incoming Portuguese Presidency, by the Helsinki European Council, to carry work forward
to this end. I would be forgetting my past if I did not say that this area is a particular priority for
me.
We will also be looking specifically at arrangements  covering the consultation and possible
participation allowing third countries to contribute to EU military crisis management. We cannot
afford to be exclusive. We are committed to establishing  structures which allow for full and
transparent dialogue. If the Union decides to launch an operation using NATO assets, the non-EU
members of NATO will have a right to participate. The precise arrangements  will need to be looked
at carefully, but I am convinced that any EU-led operations can only be enhanced by wider
participation, and that this also will in turn help strengthen the effectiveness of NATO.
I will also be examining in more detail how the Union can make better use of WEU assets and
know-how. In particular we need to develop a culture of complete transparency between the EU
and the WEU. The expertise and specialised resources of the WEU have to be put fully at the
disposal of the European Union. My own double-hatted  appointment as Secretary-general of the
WEU should assist this process. I  can at least say that cooperation between the current
Secretary-generals  of the EU and WEU is beyond reproach! The WEU has also recently completed
its own audit of our collective and national force capabilities. This will be an invaluable basis for
setting out the package of capabilities which the EU will need to carry out effective  operations
across the whole Petersberg  spectrum. It has also helped us to identify where improvements  can be
made in decision-making  structures. There are lessons here for both the EU and the WEU.
The press have inevitably focussed on the decision at Helsinki on military capabilities, This aspect
of crisis management is of course new for the EU. But equally important are the non-military
aspects. Many of the tools for this are available and in some cases are already being used in
response to crises. Individual Member States, as well as the Union, have developed  considerable
expertise in this area. Resources and experience already exist in the fields of civilian policing,
humanitarian  assistance, electoral and human rights monitoring. The list is long. But we need
firstly to improve coordination.  Helsinki recognises this. We have also agreed that we need to
identify, on the basis of the existing work on the inventory of resources, those areas where further
efforts are needed, We have established an action plan to ensure that we are able to respond
rapidly and more effectively with non-military tools to emerging crisis situations. If crises can be
defused through non-military  means; so much the better. We will never be looking for an excuse to
deploy military forces. But recent experience has shown that there will be situations where they will
be necessary.  Situations where the European  public will expect us to back up our words with
actions, where NGOs cannot carry out their humanitarian tasks without adequate protection, where
we will be called to fulfil a peace-keeping role. In these cases, we have to have the capacity to act
militarily, either with or independent of any civilian action.
The European Union, more so than many international organisations,  is already in a strong position
to use its longstanding  experience and considerable resources on the non-military  aspects of crisis
management. This is one area in particular where the EU can offer added value. But we still need to
strengthen our coordination, responsiveness  and efficiency. The Helsinki European Council has
asked me to work with the incoming Portuguese Presidency on a study to define concrete targets in
order to establish a rapid reaction capability  for our collective  non-military  response to international
crises. We will also be moving rapidly, in response to the mandate given by Helsinki, to establish a
coordinating mechanism for civilian crisis management. Of course, all this work has to be done in
close co-operation  with the European Commission. The excellent relations with Chris Patten and his
staff will ensure the success of this task.
The Helsinki conclusions are thorough and comprehensive.  But you may have looked in vain for a
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reference in them to resource implications. In short, how are we to pay for all this. Given that the
proposals are largely about the effective use of existing Member State resources, the answer should
lie properly with them. But does all this imply an increase of resources? This is a sensitive question
to ask, both to our Treasury  masters and to our public opinion in "Taxpayer format". In a way, it is
too late for Defence budgets to benefit from a post-Cold War peace dividend; and too early to
benefit from a CFSP-dividend,
Although the threat of a global and ultimately totally destructive conflict has mercifully receded,  we
do not live in a trouble-free  world. We are witnessing instead a proliferation of more limited and
regional security threats. In a world which is increasingly  interdependent, we cannot ignore these
crises, and we cannot ignore their terrible fall-out in terms of human suffering, and of regional
instability. In this new situation we do not necessarily need more resources, but we must adapt our
existing ones. The development of a European Security and Defence Policy offers us this
opportunity.  We each have to adapt at a national level to face these new challenges,  But we also
have to adapt at a European level in order to rationalise our existing resources. There are certain
capabilities  which Europe needs but does not yet have - Helsinki made this clear. But there is also
considerable  scope for much more effective use of existing resources.  We need to continue to
ensure that European defence industries restructure. We need greater cooperation and
harmonisation of our planning requirements and our procurement policy. In short, Europe needs
better value for money. If we can achieve this, we shall also go a long way in helping to reinforce
NATO's own Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI),
The full realisation of a European Security and Defence  Policy requires much further work. Helsinki
has set us on track. I am determined to help ensure that the momentum is maintained. In an age
of increasing globalisation, many are insecure, feeling threatened by events over which they
consider they have little if any control, We cannot respond to this by pretending  these problems do
not exist. Transnational problems require transnational solutions. The development of an effective
ESDP is an important contribution. It will give us the ability, where appropriate  and whenever
necessary,  to show that the Union is not prepared to stand idly by in the face of crises, Nor always
to let others shoulder responsibility. It will be a sign that the European integration dreamed by
Europe's founding fathers has come of age.
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